Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence by Gold, Victor J.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 58 Number 3 
7-1-1983 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of 
Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence 
Victor J. Gold 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 
58 Wash. L. Rev. 497 (1983). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol58/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 403:
OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE
Victor J. Gold*
Modem evidence law favors admissibility. The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, for example, eliminate many old exclusionary doctrines' while
creating an expansive definition of relevancy. 2 This orientation toward
admissibility suggests an underlying faith that triers of fact can separate
wheat from chaff.
While keeping the faith, however, the lawyers who drafted the Federal
Rules also kept their options open. Rule 403 gives the court the discretion
to exclude otherwise admissible evidence when the probative value of
that evidence is "substantially outweighed" by, among other things,
"unfair prejudice." 3 Rule 403 is intended to provide protection against
the danger that the enlarged scope of admissibility under the Federal
Rules will place before the trier of fact evidence which may lead to an
improper decision. 4 Because of its importance as a device to control the
flow of evidence in a system otherwise biased in favor of increasing the
flow, Rule 403 has been termed "the cornerstone ' 5 of the Federal Rules.
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University; B.A., 1972, J.D., 1975, University of California
at Los Angeles. This article was written with the assistance of an Edward W. Cleary Research Grant
for which the author expresses his gratitude.
I. For example, Article VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence abolishes many of the traditional
grounds for declaring a witness incompetent to testify, leaving only the requirement of personal
knowledge (FED. R. EvID. 602) and the limitations on the competency of judges (FED. R. EvlD. 605)
and jurors (FED. R. EvID. 606). Article VII expands the admissibility of opinion evidence, abolishing
the requirement of a hypothetical question (FED. R. EVID. 703, 705) and permitting experts to testify
on "ultimate issues" (FED. R. EVID. 704). Article VIII expands the scope of admissible hearsay (FED.
R. EvID. 801, 803, 804). See generally Rothstein, Some Themes in the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 21, 21-23 (1974) (discussing the bias toward admissibility present in the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence).
2. Rule 401 makes relevant "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."
3. Rule 403 reads as follows: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Over 22 states have adopted a form of Rule 403. See J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WENsTEIN's EVIDENCE T-28 to -33 (1982). In addition, many other states have adopted
similar rules granting courts discretion to exclude prejudicial evidence. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §
352 (West 1966).
4. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5212, at 250 (1978).
5. Peterfreund, Relevance and its Limits in the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the U/nited States
District Courts: Article IV, 25 REc. A.B. CIT N.Y. 80, 83 (1970). Professor Morgan, the reporter
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While evidence scholars are eloquent on the significance of Rule 403,
they are curiously mute as to basic aspects of its meaning. For example,
the commentators and the courts have failed to develop a coherent defini-
tion of unfair prejudice. 6 Uncertain as to the nature of the evil proscribed
by Rule 403, the courts have generally reacted to claims of unfair preju-
dice on an ad hoc basis. They have been preoccupied with the factual
nuances of each case, failing to engage in any broader analysis which
might facilitate evaluation of those facts. 7 The search for unfairly prejudi-
cial evidence has thus been reduced to the often tried but seldom very true
approach: "I know it when I see it."8
As the number and variety of cases applying Rule 403 mounts, the cost
of the failure to develop a coherent definition of unfair prejudice becomes
increasingly clear. Without a guide to identifying or measuring the danger
of unfair prejudice, the balancing required by Rule 4039 cannot meaning-
fully be conducted. How the courts use their discretion to exclude evi-
dence under Rule 403 can neither be predicted nor effectively reviewed.
The claim of unfair prejudice has become the closing shot of every objec-
tion, trivializing an important principle while unduly increasing the num-
ber of legal issues that must be decided before the presentation of evi-
dence may proceed. The efficacy of Rule 403, which is a basic
assumption behind the expansion of admissibility under the Federal
Rules, has become doubtful.
The object of this article is to identify what makes evidence unfairly
prejudicial. 10 The first part analyzes the language of and the policies be-
hind Rule 403, and demonstrates that the courts' current ad hoc approach
has frustrated those policies and prevented the rule from operating as
written. Part II analyzes the nature of unfairly prejudicial evidence in
light of the policies intended to be advanced by Rule 403. That part con-
cludes that evidence may be considered unfairly prejudicial when it has a
for the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence, similarly referred to the Model Code's
Rule 303, a provision nearly identical to Federal Rule 403, as the "keystone of the arch." Morgan,
The Code of Evidence Proposed by the American Law Institute, 27 A.B.A. J. 539,542 (1941).
6. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220, 237-38 (1976); C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5215, at 276-77.
7. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
8. Dolan, supra note 6, at 237-38, quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stew-
art, J., concurring).
9. Recognizing the unfairly prejudicial nature of evidence is merely the first step in resolving a
Rule 403 problem. The probative value of the evidence must also be established and then balanced
against its prejudicial tendencies.
10. This article is limited to the first step in dealing with a Rule 403 problem; it undertakes no
comprehensive analysis regarding the subsequent steps. See supra note 9. Once the nature of unfairly
prejudicial evidence has been defined, however, one can better understand what is to be balanced and
how the balancing should be conducted. The latter issues will be developed at length in a subsequent
article by the author.
Vol. 58:497, 1983
Federal Rule of Evidence 403
tendency to cause the trier of fact to commit an inferential error. 11 The
third part describes recent empirical research in cognitive psychology
which could help courts identify evidence that tends to induce inferential
error. Part IV demonstrates how this research might be applied to the type
of evidence most frequently analyzed for unfair prejudice: evidence of
other crimes or bad acts. The conclusion makes the modest proposal that
the law of evidence pay attention to how people think.
I. RULE 403: LANGUAGE, POLICY AND APPLICATION
Developing a coherent theory of unfair prejudice is necessary if Rule
403 is to be applied as it is written. If the concept of unfair prejudice has
no content, Rule 403 becomes an unlimited grant of discretion to the
courts to exclude probative evidence and provides inadequate protection
against the admission of evidence that may induce an improper decision.
These results are inconsistent with the policies behind Rule 403. The ap-
plication of Rule 403 by the courts seems to have yielded such results.
A. Policy and Language of Rule 403
Two of the fundamental policies underlying the Federal Rules are the
advancement of accurate factfinding and the promotion of fairness. 12 As
the precise formula for ascertaining truth and securing fairness has eluded
humanity since Genesis, the creators of the Federal Rules understandably
assumed that specific rules could not yield truth and fairness in every
case. Accordingly, Rule 403 bestows upon courts the discretion to ex-
clude evidence even when the other rules of evidence suggest admissibil-
ity. Implicit in the creation of this discretionary power is the assumption
that truth and justice cannot be captured by mere language, but require the
intervention of human sensibilities. 13 On a more mundane level, Rule 403
recognizes that definite rules based on past situations sometimes do not
work in new and unexpected contexts. 14 The purpose of Rule 403 is thus
to advance accuracy and fairness through judicial flexibility. 15
11. Evidence may be considered unfairly prejudicial for other reasons, but the reason suggested
in the text is by far the most common. See infra note 41 and accompanying text, and infra note 49.
12. FED. R. EvID. 102.
13. 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5023, at 134-35; Weinstein, Some Difficulties
in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 241 (1966).
14. See McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence. 24 A.B.A. J. 507, 511 (1938).
15.. See Dolan, supra note 6, at 226-28. While the advisory committee's note to Rule 403 does
not specifically articulate the policies behind that rule, it does indicate that Rules 404 to 412 "reflect
the policies underlying the present rule." The policy of advancing fairness is consistently identified
as a goal of the other Article IV rules. See, e.g., 23 C. WRIHtrr & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5282,
499
Washington Law Review
The language of Rule 403, however, demonstrates that the discretion-
ary power it creates is not limitless. The power to exclude otherwise ad-
missible evidence may be exercised only after a court has detected the
presence of unfair prejudice or some other enumerated danger or consid-
eration, 1 6 and concluded that the probative value of the evidence is "sub-
stantially outweighed" thereby. 17
This limitation on the courts' discretion is just as necessary to the ad-
vancement of truth and fairness as is the discretionary power itself. Un-
bridled judicial discretion leads to unpredictability, inequality of treat-
ment and elevation of individual whim over principles validated by
experience as well as by the popular will. The need to limit discretion in
the application of laws of evidence is particularly great. Because evidenti-
ary issues must be decided frequently and quickly at trial, evidence law
must also be relatively simple to understand and administer. Leaving the
resolution of those issues to unrestrained discretion does not simplify the
law; it merely shrouds the law in a cloud of arbitrariness. 18
B. Application of Rule 403
A distressingly large number of cases purporting to apply Rule 403
conclude that evidence is or is not unfairly prejudicial without explaining
why or even attempting to define unfair prejudice. 19 Still more cases ut-
at 96 (FED. R. EVID. 407), § 5302, at 170 (FED. R. EVID. 408), § 5322, at 298 (FED. R. EVID. 409)
and § 5362, at 429 (FED. R. EvID. 411).
16. The courts fail to make much of a distinction among the "dangers" of prejudice, confusion
of the issues and misleading the jury. They often discuss both confusion of the issues and misleading
the jury in terms of prejudice. See Dolan, supra note 6, at 238 n.64. For a general discussion of the
meaning of "confusion of the issues" and "misleading the jury," see 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 4, §§ 5216-17. In light of the definition of prejudice offered in this article, links between
that "danger" and the "considerations" of undue delay, waste of time, and needless presentation of
cumulative evidence can also be established. See infra note 103.
17. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5212, at 256.
18. For an excellent discussion of the dynamics between certainty and flexibility in Rule 403, see
22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5212.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Vik, 655 F.2d 878, 881-82 (8th Cir. 1981) (court fails to weigh
prejudicial impact of prior crimes evidence); United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102, 108 (7th Cir.)
(court assumes, without elaboration, that prior crimes evidence would not be used for improper pur-
pose), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946 (1979); Dums v. United States, 562 F.2d 542, 548 (8th Cir.) (court
relies on trial court's finding of no unfair prejudice outweighing probative value), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 959 (1977); United States v. Herzberg, 558 F.2d 1219, 1225 (5th Cir.) (testimony produced in
rebuttal concerning bad reputation of defendant concluded to be "not excessively prejudicial"; other-
wise, "no evidence of community reputation for truthfulness could ever be presented in mail fraud
prosecutions"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977); United States v. Araujo, 539 F.2d 287, 290 (2d
Cir.) (failure to acknowledge prejudicial impact of prior crimes evidence), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
983 (1976); Giblin v. United States, 523 F.2d 42, 45 (8th Cir. 1975) (photograph of victim's skeleton
not prejudicial; no analysis given), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 971 (1976); United States v. Moore, 522
F.2d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 1975) (court fails to consider prejudicial impact of similar crimes evi-
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terly fail to conduct the required balancing test20 or, while purporting to
balance, give no hint as to how or why a particular balance was struck.21
The appellate courts commonly excuse these lapses on the grounds that
Rule 403 grants courts discretion, 22 ignoring the fact that the rule bestows
discretion to exclude only after the court makes a serious search for preju-
dice and an honest attempt to balance. This approach by the appellate
dence), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976). See generally 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note
4, § 5215, at 277 (discussing courts' failure to define prejudice).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Pry, 625 F.2d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 1980) (no attempt to balance
prejudicial impact of evidence of prior wrong against its probative value), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 925
(1981); United States v. Fleming, 594 F.2d 598, 607-08 (7th Cir.) (no attempt to balance prejudicial
impact of photographs of victim's nude and bound body against its probative value), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 93 (1979); Simpson v. Norwesco, Inc., 583 F.2d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir. 1978) (no attempt to
balance prejudicial impact of cartoon against its probative value); United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d
1264, 1265-66 (5th Cir. 1977) (no attempt to balance prejudicial impact of stolen checks and finger-
print evidence against their probative value).
21. For cases excluding the disputed evidence, see, for example, Fury Imports, Inc. v. Shake-
speare Co., 625 F.2d 585,589 (5th Cir. 1980) (court fails to state why prejudicial impact of evidence
bearing on when a claim arose outweighs probative value), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981); United
Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Law Firm of Best, Sharp, Thomas & Glass, 624 F.2d 145, 149 (10th Cir.
1980) (same, as to testimony concerning settlement offers); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381,
383 (1st Cir. 1979) (same, as to expert testimony concerning unreliability of identification evidence);
United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1240 (2d Cir.) (same, as to prior crimes evidence), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Briscoe, 574 F.2d 406, 408 (8th Cir.) (same, as to
exculpatory evidence), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 858 (1978). For cases admitting the disputed evidence,
see, for example, United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1977) (court fails to state why
prejudicial impact of similar crimes evidence does not outweigh probative value), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 994 (1978); United States v. Gano, 560 F.2d 990, 993 (10th Cir. 1977) (same, as to other
crimes evidence); Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 288, 293 (10th Cir. 1977) (same, as to
telegraphic communications).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Longoria, 624 F.2d 66, 68 (9th Cir.) (admission of prior crimes
evidence affirmed without discussion of prejudicial impact or balancing on grounds trial court entitled
to great deference), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 858 (1980); United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 889
(9th Cir.) (court affirms admission of guns into evidence without review of prejudice or balance on
grounds trial court is entitled to wide discretion), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962 (1979); United States v.
D'Alora, 585 F.2d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 1978) (court merely mentions balancing test, then relies on discre-
tion vested in trial court); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 495 (9th Cir.) (determination of
balance between probative value and prejudicial impact "rests squarely within the sound discretion of
the trial judge"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978); United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46, 49 (5th
Cir. 1978) (court assumes trial court determined probative value outweighed potential prejudice);
United States v. Hall, 565 F.2d 1052, 1055 (8th Cir. 1977) (court describes balancing as "primarily"
trial court's task and affirms admission of evidence of attempts to influence witnesses); United States
v. Peden, 556 F.2d 278, 280-81 (5th Cir.) (court notes trial judge "carefully balanced" probative
force against prejudicial impact without reviewing specifics of the balance), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
871 (1977); United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir.) (court fails to indicate why
probative value of other crimes evidence outweighs prejudicial impact, relying on trial court's wide
discretion), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971 (1977); United States v. Cowsen, 530 F.2d 734, 738 (7th
Cir.) (court fails to review particulars of trial judge's determination), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906
(1976); United States v. Jenkins, 525 F.2d 819, 824 (6th Cir. 1975) (admission of defendant's prison
record and firearm assumed to be proper unless trial court committed "grave abuse of discretion").
See generally 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5212 (limiting discretion);id. § 5223
(misuse of Rule 403 by appellate courts).
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courts arguably perpetuates the improper application of Rule 403 by trial
courts.
2 3
It is indicative of the deficiency of the state of law in this area that the
common scholarly response would simply require trial courts deciding
Rule 403 issues to state their reasoning for the record. 24 This requirement
serves no useful purpose unless it encourages the courts to do more than
state their Rule 403 reasoning in uninformative and conclusory terms. It
is unreasonable, however, to expect more for the very reason that existing
Rule 403 case law is deficient: No court seems to know what unfair preju-
dice js.25 Absent a coherent theory of unfair prejudice, trial courts cannot
meaningfully evaluate evidence on or off the record for the presence of
unfair prejudice, nor can they conduct the required balancing test.
The costs of the current disarray in Rule 403 law are large. 26 When the
courts have unlimited discretionary authority under Rule 403 to exclude
evidence otherwise admissible under the rules, the efficacy of those rules
is undermined. On the other hand, if evidence is admitted because of an
inability to define prejudice, and the trier of fact is consequently induced
to make a decision on improper grounds, the framework of burdens of
proof and presumptions erected by the law may be shaken. 27 For exam-
ple, gory photographs of the victim of a crime may be so vivid that their
probative value is grossly overvalued by the jury while comparatively
pallid but highly probative defense evidence is ignored. 28 Thus the jury
may conclude that the presumption of innocence is rebutted and the bur-
den of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt29 is met by evidence logi-
cally insufficient to achieve this result. Moreover, the improper admis-
sion or exclusion of evidence in a criminal prosecution on the basis of an
incoherent or unarticulated concept of prejudice may violate the defen-
dant's rights to due process and a fair trial. 30 Finally, if important evi-
23. See Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 635, 667 (1971).
24. See, e.g., 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, 403(02), at 403-17 to -18; Note,
Determining Relevancy: Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 70, 76 (1975).
25. See supra note 6.
26. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
27. See Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021, 1032-34 (1977).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 101-02.
29. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364-65 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
elements constituting a crime required under the due process clause).
30. This can happen either when important defense evidence is excluded, see U.S. v. Thompson,
615 F.2d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 1980) (exclusion of defendant's evidence under Rule 403 denied him
right to fair trial), or when unduly prejudicial prosecution evidence is allowed in, see United States ex
rel. Harris v. Illinois, 457 F.2d 191, 198 (7th Cir.) (dicta that admission of prosecution evidence
concerning evidence of other crimes may deny right to fair trial), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 860 (1972);
United States ex rel. Durso v. Pate, 426 F.2d 1083, 1086 (7th Cir. 1970) (same), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 995 (1971). Interestingly, Rule 403 has frequently been used to exclude evidence offered by
Vol. 58:497, 1983
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dentiary decisions are made and substantive rights affected on the basis of
rules that even lawyers do not understand, public confidence in the pros-
pects for achieving justice through our courts will hardly be inspired.
In sum, the current application of Rule 403 without an understanding
of the nature of unfair prejudice subverts rather than advances the inter-
ests of accuracy and fairness. Attempting to apply a rigid definition of
prejudice is no better: Prejudice is largely a product of the circumstances
of each case and the viewpoints of the decisionmakers confronting those
circumstances. 31 But absent at least a theory of the nature of the dangers
to be guarded against, Rule 403 is useless. It is to the job of devising such
a theory that this article now turns.
II. DEFINING "UNFAIR PREJUDICE"
Evidence presents the danger of unfair prejudice when it threatens the
fundamental goals of the Federal Rules and Rule 403: accuracy and fair-
ness. 32 The following analysis rejects the prevailing notion that prejudi-
cial evidence is anything that induces the trier of fact to employ emotion
rather than logic in its judgment. Emotion is often associated with fair-
ness and can be consistent with accuracy. The results of logic, on the
other hand, can be no more accurate or fair than are the premises from
which the logician proceeds. Evidence is not necessarily unfairly prejudi-
cial because of the methodology it induces the decisionmaker to employ.
Detecting unfairly prejudicial evidence requires focusing on the end
product of the prejudice, not just on the process by which the prejudice
might be created. Under such an approach, the goals of Rule 403 suggest
that evidence is unfairly prejudicial to the extent it has a tendency to cause
the trier of fact to commit inferential error.
A. Emotion as Prejudice
Current case law considers "emotion" the hallmark of unfair preju-
dice. 33 This notion may have been derived from the advisory committee's
defendants in criminal actions. See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980); United States v. Castell, 584 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 925 (1979); United States v. Briscoe, 574 F.2d 406 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 858 (1978); United States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Pa.), aff'dmem., 523 F.2d 1051
(1975). Justice Department opposition to an early version of Rule 403 considered by Congress may
thus have reflected an unduly pessimistic view of the impact of Rule 403. See 117 CONG. REC.
33,650 (1971).
31. See 22 C. WR~rHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5215, at 278-79.
32. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
33. ' See, e.g., United States v. Salisbury, 662 F.2d 738, 741 (11th Cir. 1981) (evidence of prior
bad acts not so "heinous" as to incite the jury to irrationality), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2907 (1982);
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note to Rule 403, which suggests that unfair prejudice is commonly
caused by emotion. 34 While the note leaves open the possibility that there
are other causes, none are identified.
Equating emotion with prejudice is a mistake. While emotion can be an
improper basis for a judgment, it can also have an acceptable, and even
vital role in reaching an accurate and fair decision. It is both unrealistic
and undesirable to expect a jury not to react emotionally to much of what
goes on in a courtroom. This is true not only in cases with obvious emo-
tive content, but also in virtually every case in which the actions and in-
tentions of human beings are to be judged. In fact, the ability of twelve
laypersons to interject human sensibilities into a proceeding otherwise
dominated by the cold logic of the law arguably embodies the true worth
of the jury system. This ability adds to, rather than detracts from, truth
and accuracy by advancing the jury's empathic understanding of what the
participants likely did and why. It is no coincidence that the type of litiga-
tion generally considered least susceptible to proper treatment by a jury is
that which deals with abstract technical matters. 35 Such cases may be in-
appropriate for trial by jury not only because they require intellectual re-
sources many jurors lack, but also because they do not require the human,
"emotional" resources jurors can provide.
Equating emotion with prejudice is also inconsistent with lay attitudes
concerning justice. Emotive aspects of a case have an effect on a jury
because those aspects are commonly perceived as vital to the rendition of
justice. Eliminating evidence with emotional appeal would thus also
eliminate public confidence in our system of laws as a moral force. The
United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1337 (9th Cir. 1977) (prior crimes evidence not likely to
"inflame" the jury), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978); United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076,
1091 (2d Cir. 1975) (evidence concerning defendant's lies about Swiss bank transactions not "highly
inflammatory"), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976). See also 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 4, § 5215, at 275-77. Some of the assumptions made by the courts concerning what sort of
evidence will induce an emotional reaction from the jury are quite remarkable. Compare, for exam-
ple, the three prior bad acts cases cited above with United States v. Johnson, 558 F.2d 744, 746 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978), where evidence that the defendant neglected to take
certain tax deductions was offered in defense of tax fraud charges and was excluded on the grounds of
emotional appeal.
Other judicial assumptions about the nature of human emotions are also worthy of note. Relevant
to Rule 403, for example, is the assumption that even though evidence may at first blush make juries
wildly passionate and irrational, the emotional spigot can be turned off by instructions from the
bench. See, e.g., United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 87 (4th Cir. 1980).
34. FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee note.
35. See Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92
HARV. L. REV. 898 (1979).
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parameters of justice are not purely coincident with the realm of logic, but
also encompass common intuition. 36
Furthermore, categorizing evidence as either "emotional" or "logi-
cal" is extremely difficult. An item of evidence may have both emotional
and logical qualities, as where photographs of the victim's body are logi-
cally probative of disputed issues. 37 Certainly before evidence can be so
categorized, emotion and logic must be defined and differentiated. No
court, however, has defined emotion or logic in this context. Given the
looseness of these terms, counsel can always argue for the "logic" of
their case and against the "emotional appeal" of their opponent's.
Just as emotion is not always an improper basis for decision, logic is
not a talisman against inaccuracy and unfairness. The inferences derived
from evidence can be relentlessly logical, but if that logic flows from
improper premises, the evidence is prejudicial. 38 If, for example, a juror
believes "once a thief, always a thief," evidence of the defendant's prior
criminal record may logically lead to the conclusion that defendant is
guilty as now charged. If the premise is wrong, the evidence giving effect
to the premise through the process of logic leads to inaccuracy and unfair-
ness.
Defining unfair prejudice in terms of the distinction between emotion
and logic is, in part, the product of a simplistic view of the nature of the
problems Rule 403 seeks to remedy. Proponents of this view envision the
typical case as one in which the jury is confronted with the gruesome
debris of the crime and is so repulsed that it is prepared to convict whom-
ever is available without seriously considering guilt or innocence. 39 In the
context of evidence of other crimes or bad acts, the danger of unfair pre-
judice is often seen in terms of the jury's inclination to convict the defen-
dant not because it determines the defendant is guilty as charged, but out
of hatred for the defendant, who is seen as a "bad person.' '40
36. See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1329, 1375-76(1971).
37. See, e.g., United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862
(1979).
38. Just as logic can yield inaccurate inferences when based on an improper premise, it can give
effect to other dangerous actions. The extermination of European Jewry in World War II was, at least
in part, the product of a ruthlessly logical and unemotional bureaucracy operating under horrific
premises. See H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1965).
39. See I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, 403(03), at 403-19 to -22 (evidence is
unfairly prejudical when it "appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its
instinct to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action [which] may cause a jury to base its
decision on something other than the established propositions in the case" (footnotes omitted)).
40. See, e.g., Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence,
66 IowA L. REv. 777, 778 (1981); United States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981).
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It is undoubtedly true that occasionally a jury is so emotionally moved
by a particular piece of evidence that it neglects the issues it has been
charged to decide and intentionally renders judgment on some other
basis. Evidence which causes this should be considered prejudicial. How-
ever, while empirical data directly on this point is lacking, it seems un-
likely such a breakdown occurs very often. 4 1 While an occasional juror
may lose sight of the issues to be decided, a simultaneous lapse by the rest
of the jury or even a majority must be rare. Efforts by counsel to induce a
jury to act in this manner will frequently be obvious and offensive. In any
event, if there were a basis for believing that such dereliction of duty by
juries is commonplace, the jury system would not endure. It seems far
more likely that most jurors diligently attempt to perform the tasks with
which they are charged but, as described in the next part, they are some-
times unequal to those tasks.
B. Inferential Error as Prejudice
Application of Rule 403 should be focused on a more subtle, common
and dangerous problem: the introduction of evidence that has a tendency
to lead the jury to unintentionally commit an inferential error. Inferential
error occurs when the jury incorrectly decides that evidence is probative
of an alleged fact or event. For example, evidence of damage is usually
not probative of liability. When a jury concludes that the seriousness of
plaintiff's injuries suggests that defendant must have been negligent, the
evidence of damage has been prejudicial. 42 It is prejudicial not because
the jury has been emotionally moved by the evidence, but because the
evidence has induced an inferential error.
Inferential error also occurs when the jury decides that evidence is
more or less probative of a fact or event than it is. For example, the preju-
dicial impact of photographs of a victim's gory remains derives from the
potential such vivid evidence has to so dominate the minds of jurors that
they exaggerate its probativeness. The fact that evidence of this type may
evoke an emotional reaction from the jury does not necessarily make it
prejudicial. There may be nothing wrong with shocking a jury with the
repulsiveness of a crime, as long as the impression made by the evidence
in question is commensurate with its probative worth.43
41. For example, Professors Kalven and Zeisel report data which, for the most part, positively
reflect upon a jury's ability to understand its charge and the evidence. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 149-62 (1966).
42. This is an example of a common inferential error. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying
text.
43. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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Prejudice resulting from evidence that induces inferential error is subtle
because it occurs when the jury diligently pursues the issues it is charged
with deciding but errs in a manner that may not be obvious to its members
or to others. 44 Such prejudice is relatively common because, as described
below, humans regularly use flawed procedures and preconceptions in
evaluating evidence and drawing inferences therefrom. 45 Prejudice result-
ing from evidence that induces inferential error is dangerous precisely be-
cause it is so subtle and common. 46
Characterizing unfair prejudice as the danger created by evidence hav-
ing a tendency to promote inferential error has the satisfying quality of
obvious compatability with one of the basic goals of Rule 403-the ad-
vancement of truth and accuracy. Applying this definition, however, also
has at least two obvious difficulties. It is not clear how the other basic
goal of Rule 403, fairness, is accommodated by this definition. It is also
not clear how one goes about identifying evidence with error-producing
tendencies. Both problems, however, can be resolved.
Analyzing what is fair in a given situation, much less defining fairness
generally, is profoundly difficult. This analysis is especially difficult in a
legal context since most lawyers have been trained not to ask such ques-
tions. The concept of procedural or evidentiary fairness is particularly
slippery in that it is often influenced by the policies of the substantive
law, 47 which are subject to change. Moreover, any attempt to fix the pa-
rameters of fairness is subject to the accusation that the evolution of the
concept of fairness will thereby be halted, thus stunting the "growth and
development of the law." 48 But even if fairness cannot be dissected, its
contours can be described.
Accuracy is an aspect of fairness. The goal of fairness is thus not ig-
nored by defining unfair prejudice as the danger presented by evidence
tending to promote inferential error. Admittedly, however, fairness in the
law of evidence often means considerably more than accurate factfinding.
The law is replete with rules which, in the cause of fairness, exclude
highly probative evidence and thus detract from the goal of accuracy. 49
44. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
45. See infra part III.
46. "It is what men do at their best, with good intentions, and what normal men and women find
that they must and will do in spite of their intentions, that really concern us." G.B. SHAW, SAINT
JOAN, lxxv (1924).
47. See 1 J. WENsTEiN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, 403(01), at 403-1.
48. FED. R. EVID. 102.
49. Rules establishing evidentiary privileges, for example, clearly deprive the trier of fact of
valuable evidence for the sake of fairness or some other goal. See MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 152 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). There are many policies other than accuracy which
might be advanced by excluding evidence on the ground of unfair prejudice. See I J. WENsTEIN &
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Nevertheless, accuracy may be the most important indicator of fairness
under Rule 403.
Perhaps the most salient fact of litigation life is that attorneys are gen-
erally not so much concerned with the truth as they are with winning. 50
However, the danger that they will distort, mislead or even lie is usually
reduced by the adversary's power to reveal the deceit. 51 Providing each
side with a meaningful opportunity to be heard is thus not only a funda-
mental aspect of fairness but also central to the goal of accuracy.
When the tendency of evidence to induce inferential error cannot be
overcome by opposing counsel, that evidence is unfairly prejudicial. The
opportunity to challenge such evidence may be insufficient due to a lack
of clarifying evidence or because the evidence distorts the truth in such a
subtle way that its dangers cannot be explained to the jury. 52 The courts
have frequently invoked the concept of fairness as a basis for excluding
evidence under Rule 403 in precisely this context.53 Conversely, when
M. BERGER. supra note 3. $ 403(01), at 403-11. Thus limiting the definition of unfair prejudice to the
tendency of evidence to induce inferential error is not appropriate in every case.
50. Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 48,
52-53 (D. Lemer ed. 1958).
51. However, one might question the likelihood that somehow the truth will magically emerge
from a process conducted by opponents who both place winning over accuracy.
52. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285, 292 (10th Cir. 1978) (evidence was preju-
dicial because it implied defendant committed prior crimes, and defendant could not effectively rebut
such evidence without waiving objection to direct evidence of prior crimes); United States v. Stabler,
490 F.2d 345, 348-49 (8th Cir. 1974) (testimony regarding bloodstains on clothing was unfairly
prejudicial since stains had been consumed by prosecution's tests, depriving defendant of opportunity
to conduct his own tests); Thomas v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 465 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D.S.C. 1979)
(plaintiff's video tape depicting his painful condition excluded as unfairly prejudicial because defen-
dant had no opportunity to depict plaintiff's absense of pain in similarly vivid manner); United States
v. DeMarco, 407 F. Supp. 107, 114 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (testimony was unfairly prejudicial because
inaccuracies could not be rebutted without evidence that was itself highly prejudicial); Apicella v.
McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (misleading evidence could not be
rebutted due to denial of discovery to defendant).
Applying a related version of the connection between accuracy and fairness under Rule 403, the
courts have admitted evidence that was conceded to be prejudicial when the evidence was necessary
to allow a meaningful response to evidence of an adversary. See, e.g., Bowden v. McKenna, 600
F.2d 282, 285 (Ist Cir.) (evidence of prior crime admitted to rebut evidence suggesting party was at
hospital when the prior crime occurred), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979); Miller v. Poretsky, 595
F.2d 780, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (evidence that defendant had committed other acts of discrimination
should have been admitted despite prejudicial nature in order to rebut evidence that defendant had not
discriminated against certain witnesses); United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1250 (2d Cir.
1978) (prior crimes evidence could be admitted to rebut defendant's testimony that he had not taken
bribes); United States v. Sellers, 566 F.2d 884, 886 (4th Cir. 1977) (expert testimony excludable
under Rule 403 should have been admitted because opponent was permitted to present expert testi-
mony on same issues). There are limits, however, to the extent to which evidence otherwise inadmis-
sible under Rule 403 will be admitted to rebut. In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 125-27
(1974), for example, the defendant in a prosecution for mailing obscene material sought to introduce
materials which were readily available on newsstands or which had been found constitutionally pro-
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evidence threatens to lead the jury to error, but this threat can easily be
exposed and removed by the opponent, courts have been reluctant to con-
sider the evidence unfairly prejudicial. 54 Thus, finding unfair prejudice
under Rule 403 in the tendency to lead to inferential error advances the
cause of fairness by identifying Rule 403 as a remedy for an inadequate
opportunity to rebut. 55
Defining "unfair prejudice" in terms of the tendency of evidence to
cause inferential error would be of little value absent some guide to iden-
tifying the presence of that tendency. Attempts to develop such a guide
from case law are unlikely to be fruitful. In evaluating the prejudicial
nature of evidence, courts have made many assumptions about the infer-
ential processes of jurors and the potential of evidence to cause inferential
error. These assumptions are usually unproven and unconvincing. 56 This
should not be surprising, since judges do not necessarily have more abil-
ity to analyze the inferential processes of the human mind than do the
jurors whose minds they attempt to analyze.
Since lawyers are generally not schooled in this area, it makes sense to
seek the help of those who are. Accordingly, the following part outlines a
guide to determining when evidence has the potential to lead jurors into
inferential error by referring to empirical research in the area of cognitive
psychology. This literature suggests that people, hence jurors, predict-
ably tend to commit profound inferential errors under certain circum-
stances.
Applying these findings in the courtroom should reduce the arbitrari-
ness of judicial efforts to measure the unfairly prejudicial nature of evi-
dence. That application will not be simple. Measuring the prejudicial po-
tential of evidence requires an understanding of complex inferential
tected in prior litigation, for purposes of establishing community standards. The Supreme Court
upheld the exclusion of the materials under Rule 403 despite the admission of the "vivid" materials
the defendant had mailed.
54. See, e.g., Pierce Packing Co. v. John Morrell & Co., 633 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1980) (Rule
403 challenge to exhibits denied on grounds opponent had full opportunity to present its case con-
ceming proper inferences to be drawn therefrom); United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939, 947 (2d
Cir.) (possibility of prejudice resulting from introduction of tape recording could have been offset by
cross-examination of witness whose statements had been recorded), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870
(1980). Consistent with this theory of prejudice is the widely accepted premise that surprise is not a
basis for exclusion under Rule 403 because a continuance can provide counsel with an opportunity to
deal with the unanticipated evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note.
55. Judges in England have the discretion in criminal cases to exclude evidence which would
"operate unfairly against a defendant." Callis v. Gunn, [1964] 1 Q.B. 495, 501. This discretion is
generally limited to excluding evidence that would have an impact on the jury out of proportion to its
probative value. See The King v. Christie, 1914 A.C. 545, 559. Whether "fairness" in this context
means anything other than accuracy in the English system is a subject of current debate. See Jackson,
Unfairness and the Judicial Discretion to Exclude Evidence, 130 NEw L.J. 585 (1980).
56. See supra notes 19 and 33.
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processes combined with a sensitivity for the peculiar factual nuances of
each case. But since Rule 403 was intended to be the means by which the
courts deal with those hard questions that cannot be adequately resolved
by the more mechanical rules of evidence, the problem is inescapable. 57
If judges become familiar with this psychological research, they can at
least begin to approach those hard questions with the tools necessary to
resolve them.
III. HUMAN INFERENTIAL PROCESSES AND RULE 403
The jury's basic task is to ascertain the truth. 58 However, the truth is
seldom clear. Jurors must overcome the problems of inadequate evi-
dence, conflicting evidence, and evidence relayed through the flawed per-
ceptual, retentive and narrative abilities of witnesses. Jurors are thus
forced to estimate the truth-in other words, to judge the probability of an
alleged fact or event. Jurors make these judgments in the courtroom by
applying the cognitive tools they have fashioned and used over a lifetime.
These tools are largely reliable, but there is abundant evidence that in
particular decisionmaking contexts relevant to the trial of lawsuits these
tools may distort rather than reveal the truth. 59
57. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
58. The psychology literature surveyed in this part assumes a normative model of human infer-
ence somewhat akin to the so-called scientific model of analysis. See, e.g., R. NISBErT & L. Ross,
HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHOJZTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT ch. 1 (1980). This model
assumes there is something which may be called "the truth," that the search for it is basically a
probabilistic inquiry, and that it is more likely to be discovered through systematic and logical pro-
cesses than through, for example, a ouija board. This article makes the same assumptions, but ac-
knowledges that the first assumption raises numerous philosophical issues while the second two as-
sumptions may run counter to common belief and practice.
It should be noted, however, that the law also assumes there is something called "the truth" which
is more readily ascertainable through rational rather than irrational means. See generally Weinstein,
Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
223, 231-32 (1966). It is also conceded by legal commentators that the legal norm of rationality
means that the search for truth in the courtroom may, for heuristic purposes, be seen as essentially a
Bayesian or probabilistic process. See Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021
(1977); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1329, 1358, 1378-93 (1971). The relevance of the psychological literature reviewed here thus rests
on the fact that it shares these assumptions with the law. That relevance may be limited, however,
because the law sometimes seeks to do more than discover the truth, and these other objectives may
require that the truth be compromised. See Weinstein, supra, at 241.
59. The author of this article is not a psychologist, and, while citing psychology literature, is not
qualified to evaluate it critically. Such literature has been criticized elsewhere. See, e.g., Loftus &
Beach, Human Inference and Judgment: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 34 STAN. L. REV.
939, 950-56 (1982). Even if this literature remains subject to scholarly critique, its implications for
the law are important. See, e.g., Saks & Kidd, Human Inferential Processing and Adjudication: Trial
by Heuristics, 15 LAW & SocY REV. 123 (1980-81); Spitzer, Book Review, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1621 (1981) (reviewing R. NISBET7 & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS
OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980)). As the following discussion suggests, however, the validity of many of
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Two important cognitive tools are heuristics and knowledge structures.
An understanding of the manner in which heuristics and knowledge struc-
tures might be improperly employed by juries provides a basis for esti-
mating the tendency of evidence to lead to inferential error.
A. Heuristics
Heuristics are cognitive simplifying strategies used to reduce the com-
plexity of information that must be considered in making a decision. 60
Heuristics permit us to sift through available information and select that
which is most important. For example, in deciding whether to categorize
a particular plant as a tree or a bush, a decisionmaker may wish to avoid a
systematic study of the subject plant and the science of botany in favor of
a quick search of the plant's most salient characteristics. These character-
istics can then be compared to presumed characteristics of trees and
bushes. Using this shortcut, a decisionmaker may classify the plant as a
bush if it appears mature yet is only two feet high. But research suggests
that this strategy, while effective in many cases, can often lead to inferen-
tial errors. Thus the process described above might lead to an inferential
error if the decisionmaker were unfamiliar with bonsai trees. Further-
more, while simplifying available data, heuristics sometimes direct our
attention toward vivid, anecdotal information which may be misleading,
and away from more pallid, complex evidence which may be highly pro-
bative. The following discussion focuses on two heuristics frequently
mentioned in the relevant literature, 6' representativeness and availability.
1. The Representativeness Heuristic
The representativeness heuristic reduces problems of estimating the re-
lationship between events or physical objects to what are essentially simi-
larity judgments. As in the tree/bush hypothetical described above, peo-
ple who apply this heuristic to the problem of categorizing objects
"assess the degree to which the salient features of the object are represen-
tative of, or similar to, the features presumed to be characteristic of the
category. "62 If the plant is relatively short, the representativeness heuris-
tic suggests to the decisionmaker that there is a greater probability that it
is a bush than a tree.
the points established by this literature seems to be buttressed both by common sense and by existing
law, which in many instances has reached the same conclusions through less scientific means.
60. See generally R. NisBErr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 6-8.
61. See, e.g., R. NiSBEIT & L. Ross, supra note 58; Saks & Kidd, supra note 59.
62. R. NisBErr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 24.
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Obviously, this may be a useful decision strategy in many situations.
The salient features of objects or events, however, are not always accu-
rate indicators of the relationship between them. For example, in one
study63 an accident case was described to two groups of subjects. A man
had left his car parked on a hill. After he left the car it rolled down the
hill. The descriptions of the case given to the two groups of subjects were
identical, except that one group was told the car struck a fire hydrant
while the other group was told the car struck and injured a person. Sub-
jects informed of the more severe results found the car owner more at
fault than did subjects infomed of the trivial results. The subjects used the
representativeness heuristic to infer that the benign result had benign an-
tecedents and the destructive result had been preceded by negligence,
even though the relative seriousness of the results had nothing to do with
the car owner's degree of fault. 64
As suggested by this study, people employ the representativeness heu-
ristic when given a result and asked to infer the process by which that
result was generated. The heuristic encourages the conclusion that the
process resembles or is representative, in some salient way, of the result it
produces. 65 The reverse is also true. Given the generating process or
event, a person employing the representativeness heuristic will tend to
assume a result that resembles or is representative of its antecedent. 66
Using the representativeness heuristic may therefore lead to serious in-
ferential errors in the courtroom. For example, questions of causation, a
"process," might be resolved by simply comparing the salient character-
istics of possible causative factors with the characteristics of the given
63. Walster, Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident, 3 J. OF PERSONALITY & Soc. PSY-
CHOLOGY 73 (1966).
64. It is true that this study along with all the other studies cited herein shows only that results are
found with a certain statistical frequency in a particular population. Since not all individuals in that
population exhibit the behavior tested for, it is arguable that a given trier of fact might similarly fail to
exhibit such behavior, and thus the study does not conclusively establish a basis for detecting inferen-
tial error. However, Rule 403 does not ask the judge to look only for obvious and undeniable occur-
rences of inferential error. When asked to weigh the "danger" of unfair prejudice, a judge must
necessarily engage in calculations of probability concerning the presence of danger and the serious-
ness of that danger. That there may be exceptions to the generalizations derivable from the psychol-
ogy research cited herein suggests only that those generalizations should be the starting point of an
analysis which then must consider the specific nuances of each case.
65. Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness. 3 COGNI-
TIVE PSYCHOLOGY 430, 431 (1972).
66. Subjects in one study were asked to assess the relative likelihood of three sequences of births
of boys (B) and girls (G) for the next six babies born. The sequences were (1) BBBBBB, (2)
GGGBBB, and (3) GBBGGB. The likelihood of each sequence is almost identical according to ac-
cepted laws of probability. Most subjects, however, assumed the third sequence to be far more likely
than the other two. Since the generating process is known to be random and haphazard, most people
assume the result should look the same. Id. at 432.
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"results." 67 Similarly, calculation of damages, a "result," may be influ-
enced by the degree to which the given "process," the acts of the defen-
dant, deviate from the level of normative "non-damaging" behavior. In
each such case, vital issues may be decided on the basis of surface simi-
larities between events even though those similarities may have little or
no probative value.68
The danger presented by the representativeness heuristic is heightened
by the fact that, while the decisionmaker is led into inferential error, the
process generating that error has an aura of logic which may inspire a
strong feeling of confidence in the decision made and discourage self-
analysis. 69 The presence of this illusion of validity.may handicap efforts
by advocates to demonstrate to the jury the misleading nature of prejudi-
cial evidence, thus increasing the unfairness of admitting that evidence. 70
At the same time the representativeness heuristic focuses attention on
similarities that may be misleading, it directs attention away from other
relevant evidence of relationships between objects or events. For exam-
ple, studies show that decisionmakers supplied with representativeness
information tend to ignore less vivid but probative statistical data on the
probability of the relationship suggested by the heuristic. 71 Following this
pattern, the jury in a paternity suit is liable to be greatly influenced by a
67. R. NisBErr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 115-17.
68. Of course, surface similarities are sometimes highly probative. For example, where a witness
gives a detailed description of a criminal, similarities between the defendant and the description are
highly probative, albeit probably less probative than we think. See E. Lorus, EYEwrrNss TESTI-
MONY (1979). Use of the representativeness heuristic, however, does not assume a capacity to differ-
entiate between meaningful and misleading similarities. The very fact of similarity suggests meaning-
fulness. It should be noted that when surface similarities have absolutely no probative value, then
evidence of those similarities is irrelevant and the use of the representativeness heuristic to give im-
port to those similarities raises an issue under Rule 401, not Rule 403.
69. This phenomenon has been referred to as the "illusion of validity." See Kahneman & Tver-
sky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOLOGY REV. 237, 248-49 (1973).
70. See infra note 107.
71. See generally R. NISBETr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 141-50. One study has been de-
scribed as follows:
A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab companies, the green and the
blue, operate in the city. A witness reports that the offending cab was blue, and legal action is
brought against the blue cab company. The court learns that 85 percent of the city's cabs are
green and 15 percent are blue. Further, the court learns that on a test of ability to identify cabs
under appropriate visibility conditions, the witness is correct on 80 percent of the identifications
and incorrect on 20 percent. Several hundred persons have been given this problem and asked to
estimate the probability that the responsible cab was in fact a blue cab. Their typical probability
response was .80. In actuality, the evidence given leads to a probability of .41 that the responsi-
ble cab was blue.
Tversky & Kahneman, Causal Schemata in Judgments Under Uncertainty, in PROGRESS IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (M. Fishbein ed. 1978).
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physical resemblance between the child and the alleged father72 even in
the presence of conflicting and highly probative statistical evidence of
blood types. 73 Thus the prejudicial effect of evidence analyzed with the
representativeness heuristic may consist of not only the misleading nature
of the evidence itself, but also the lost value of other discarded evi-
dence. 74
Research also reveals that people are prone to use the representative-
ness heuristic to commit inferential error when confronted with problems
that require calculating compound probability. For example, in one
study75 subjects were provided with personality profiles of persons and
were asked to estimate separately the probability that those persons be-
longed to a particular political party and the probability that they held a
particular job. The subjects were then asked to estimate the compound
probability that the described persons both belonged to a particular party
and held a particular job. Subjects based their estimates of compound
probability on the average similarity of the personality profiles to their
stereotypes of members of the political parties and occupations in ques-
tion. As an illustration, a person judged very likely to be a Republican but
unlikely to be a lawyer would be judged moderately likely to be a Repub-
lican lawyer. Thus the subjects used the representativeness heuristic to
72. See J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 102-03 (6th ed. 1973).
73. See Ellman & Kaye, Probabilities and Proof. Can HLA and Blood Group Testing Prove
Paternity?. 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1131 (1979).
74. This suggests courts should be wary of the representativeness heuristic in cases involving
scientific or technological subject matter. See Saks & Kidd, supra note 59, at 133-34. It is ironic that
some courts have invoked Rule 403 as a basis for excluding largely statistically based expert testi-
mony aimed at attacking the reliability of eyewitness accounts because of the danger that juries may
be misled by the aura of trustworthiness surrounding such expert testimony. See, e.g., United States
v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629, 637 (M.D.
Pa.), affd menz., 523 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1975). Just the reverse seems to be true: Juries tend to
ignore pallid statistical evidence in favor of vivid eyewitness accounts, which tend to be much less
reliable than one might assume. See E. LoFTrus, supra note 68, at 178-203.
It has been asserted that statistical data refuting what the jury intuitively infers should not be re-
ceived in evidence because they may impair the perceived legitimacy of the trial. Tribe, supra note
58, at 1375-77. One could also question the perceived as well as the actual legitimacy of a judgment
based on inferential error that statistical data might have corrected. Much of the law of evidence is
based upon the philosophy that the laypersons who are jurors are not logicians, and thus should be
prevented from hearing facts that will likely inspire illogical conclusions when considered from the
jury's intiuitive perspective. Similarly, jurors should not be prevented from hearing logically proba-
tive evidence simply because they cannot intuitively appreciate its worth. With proper explanation,
the "legitimacy" of statistical evidence might be made apparent to a jury. If statistical evidence in
some cases is so abstract or complex that its import cannot be made clear to a jury, then the legiti-
macy of the jury as trier of fact in those cases may be questioned. Cf. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 4, § 5215, at 278-79 (discussing the relationship between jury selection and the prejudi-
cial impact of evidence).
75. See R. NISBETT & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 146.
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violate the basic axiom that a compound event cannot be more likely than
the least probable of its constituent events.
This study has disturbing implications for the law. Juries are frequently
asked to make judgments or draw inferences that involve the calculation
of compound probabilities. The .prima facie case for every civil cause of
action and every crime contains multiple elements, each of which must be
established with the requisite degree of proof. Bits of circumstantial evi-
dence are frequently integrated into a chain, each link of which must be
established before the ultimate fact can be inferred. The representative-
ness heuristic may incorrectly suggest to a jury that the presence of strong
links or convincingly established elements of a prima facie case can com-
pensate for weak or even absent links and elements. 76 Because the totality
of the evidence resembles a strong and complete case, the jury may ig-
nore critical defects.
Studies also suggest that the representativeness heuristic can lead to
error when jurors are asked to infer generalizations about a relatively
large amount of data. 77 In making such decisions, people are often insen-
sitive to the amount of evidence they consider and tend to be swayed by a
small amount of vivid, anecdotal information. Candidates often capitalize
upon this tendency in political debate, where the wisdom of social pro-
grams is "established" not by reference to the mass of data demonstrat-
ing their value, but by reference to an absurdly small number of colorful
case histories. The representativeness heuristic permits voters to infer in-
correctly that, since the case histories have been taken from a larger mass
of data, those histories must be representative of the mass. In the court-
room, this potential for error exists whenever the proper decision of an
issue depends upon consideration of a large body of evidence, some vivid
parts of which might be used to misrepresent the whole. 78
76. Id. at 147; Spitzer, supra note 59, at 1628-29.
77. See generally R. NISBMEr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 77-89 (describing problems in gener-
alizing from instances to populations caused by unreliability of small samples or bias in sampling
procedures).
78. See, e.g., LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F.2d 342, 352 (8th Cir. 1981) (in
action for breach of warranty, evidence that plaintiff's tax return showed plaintiff made an overall
profit for the years in question offered by defendant to prove lack of damage resulting from defective
machinery excluded as misleading and confusing), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982); Harless v.
Boyle-Midway Div., American Home Prods., 594 F.2d 1051, 1058 (5th Cir. 1979) (evidence in
wrongful death action that decedent once smoked marijuana, when offered to prove his character,
excluded as prejudicial); Reeg v. Fetzer, 78 F.R.D. 34, 37 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (evidence in medical
malpractice action that defendant did not complete a specific training program not relevant to prove
competency as general practitioner and possibly prejudical). Of course the fact that one bit of evi-
dence may seem more probative than it really is, or otherwise is not representative of a larger body of
data, does not necessarily qualify it for exclusion. In every case the court must consider the ability of
the party opposing the evidence to demonstrate to the jury its true worth, or lack thereof. See United
States v. Hickey, 596 F.2d 1082, 1089 (Ist Cir.) (fiber evidence linking defendant to crime not
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The preceding discussion demonstrates that while the representative-
ness heuristic can be an important and often effective tool for simplifying
otherwise difficult inferential problems, it can often lead to error. Predict-
ably, this heuristic presents a high danger of error in those cases where
simplification may not be appropriate--cases where relevant evidence is
unavoidably complex or abstract, linked together in a complex fashion, or
simply large in quantity. 79 In such cases, courts should be wary of the
prejudicial potential of evidence that may direct the jury's attention away
from the complexities and toward misleading similarities.
2. The Availability Heuristic
Like the representativeness heuristic, the availability heuristic is a cog-
nitive procedure designed to simplify the process of choosing data used in
making a decision. The data most available to the decisionmaker's per-
ceptions, memory and imagination will be that selected for considera-
tion. 80
The normative applications of the availability heuristic in everyday life
are numerous. For example, in predicting the probability that the morning
train will reach the station by 8 a.m., a commuter may often reliably base
his prediction on a timetable listing an 8 a.m. arrival. Often, however,
there are many factors unrelated to probability that can influence availa-
bility. If the commuter has not previously traveled on the train in ques-
tion, the fact that this train has never in the history of the railroad been on
time may be unavailable to him. Thus the availability heuristic, like the
representativeness heuristic, 81 may cause the decisionmaker to rely on
data of little or no probative value. If, in relying on a timetable, the com-
muter neglects to check its reliability with one of the weary veterans of
public transportation standing on the platform next to him, then using the
availability heuristic has also caused him to ignore the most reliable evi-
dence. 82
excludable under Rule 403 since jury was made aware that such evidence does not, like fingerprints,
point to one individual as the source), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853 (1979).
79. We cannot look entirely to the lawyers to reduce this danger. It should go without saying that
for every attorney whose case is complex or abstract there is an opposing attorney who will argue to
the jury "this is really a simple case .... "
80. See generally R. NisBErr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 18-23 (describing the potential for
bias resulting from use of the availability heuristic).
81. For a discussion of the representativeness heuristic, see supra notes 62-79 and accompany-
ing text.
82. See. e.g., Thomas v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 465 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D.S.C. 1979) (presen-
tation of video tape excluded because dramatic effect showing plaintiff in pain could never be offset
by testimony of doctors). It has been suggested that the availability of evidence for decisionmaking
can be impacted at three stages: (I) at the time evidence is selected for introduction, (2) at the time it
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Several factors unrelated to probativeness can affect the "availability"
of evidence to the jury. The literature of both psychology and law notes
that the first information presented to a decisionmaker has a dispropor-
tionately large influence over final judgments. 83 This "primacy effect"
suggests that the order in which evidence is presented to the jury can af-
fect its memorability and thus its availability in subsequent decisionmak-
ing. 84 Evidence that is revealed shortly before decisionmaking and evi-
dence that is redundant may also be available in a juror's memory to a
degree not reflective of its true probativeness.85 Courts have recognized
and attempted to limit the prejudicial impact of such evidence by using
their powers to control the order of proof86 and exclude cumulative evi-
dence. 87
is stored in memory and (3) at the time it is retrieved from memory. See R. NisBr & L. Ross, supra
note 58, at 18-21. The discussion in the text relates to the second and third stages since the law of
evidence concerns itself only with the possible impact of evidence on the jury after it is offered and
admitted and does not purport to regulate anything occurring prior to that time, such as which evi-
dence is selected by the advocates to be offered. Obviously, if the advocates select unrepresentative
or misleading evidence, what is eventually "available" to the jury may encourage inferential error.
Since both sides have the opportunity to select the evidence they offer, however, the biases in selec-
tion may cancel out each other.
There is one strong bias in selection, however, that should be mentioned here. The mere fact that
one person has been selected to be the defendant focuses attention on that individual and makes that
person a far more "available" causal factor in the commission of the alleged crime or injury than any
other person. This suggests that defense counsel should never be content with merely refuting the
case of the state or the plaintiff but, whenever possible, should also introduce evidence of other actors
or casual factors inconsistent with the defendant's guilt or liability.
83. See, e.g., R. NISBEIr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 172-75; T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF
TRIAL TECHNIQUES 49 (1980).
84. The impact of first-encountered evidence may be the result of processes more complex than
memory. It has been suggested that first-encountered evidence forms the basis of theories which are
then used to interpret all subsequently encountered information. First-encountered information may
therefore be dangerous not only because it is more memorable, but also because it impacts all subse-
quently revealed evidence. See R. NiSBrT & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 172.
85. See R. NIsBErr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 53-54, 172.
86. See, e.g., Grimes v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 610 (D. Alaska
1977) (film demonstrating plaintiff's pain and suffering not unduly prejudicial since jury not permit-
ted to view until after liability was established). But see United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1338
(9th Cir. 1977) ("There is no basis for assuming appellant was prejudiced because the evidence was
admitted in the government's case-in-chief rather than in rebuttal. The prejudice arose from the sub-
stance of the evidence, not from the timing of its introduction."), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000
(1978).
87. See, e.g., Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 239 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (testi-
mony of witness was properly excludable under Rule 403 as cumulative when it added nothing to
testimony of other witness and was merely offered to gain tactical advantage of repeating evidence
jury had heard several days earlier).
Since the frequency with which a bit of evidence is heard can significantly affect memorability and
thus prejudicial potential, a theoretical link exists between the Rule 403 "considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, [and] needless presentation of cumulative evidence" and the "danger of unfair
prejudice."
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Perhaps the most significant factor influencing the memorability and
hence the availability of evidence is its vividness. Vividness affects the
likelihood that data will be perceived, stored in memory and retrieved for
use in the decisionmaking process. It also affects the priority vivid evi-
dence is given in that process in relation to other evidence. 88 Because
jurors have been conditioned by television and motion pictures to expect a
lawsuit to turn on some piece of vivid or dramatic evidence, the effect
such evidence has when it is revealed in a courtroom may be even greater
than the effect vivid evidence has in other contexts.
Evidence which, because of its vividness, is selected by the availability
heuristic to influence a decision presents a danger of inferential error be-
cause vividness is normally only vaguely related to probativeness.8 9
Courts have long recognized the potential prejudicial impact of vivid evi-
dence. Decisions concerning the admissibility of gory photographs, for
example, are among the most common Rule 403 cases. 90 What makes
evidence vivid is thus central to determining what makes evidence preju-
dicial.
Evidence is vivid when it is emotionally interesting-that is, relevant
to the jury in some personal way. 91 Thus when the parties to, or subject
matter of, a lawsuit are familiar to a prospective juror, her emotional in-
volvement is obvious and may even be grounds for disqualification. 92 Ev-
idence is also personally relevant when it relates to juror values. Testi-
mony about a defendant's sex, drug or political practices may be
especially vivid, as might evidence of an exemplary war record. 93 The
88. See generally R. NISBE-rr & L. Ross, supra note 58, ch. 3 (examining the greater inferential
impact of vivid information).
89. See id. at 59-61. Vividness may also be a factor in judging the tendency of evidence to
generate inferential error through the representativeness heuristic, since the vivid or salient character-
istics of objects or events are those most likely to be considered in judging the probability of relation-
ships between those objects or events.
90. See generally 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5215, at 283-84 (discussing the
use of Rule 403 in assessing the admissibility of gruesome photographs).
91. See R. NISBErr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 45-47.
92. "Familiarity" in this context includes something more than direct personal or financial rela-
tionships. It encompasses anything about the parties or the subject matter that attracts or repels a juror
in a way that would not be common to all in the community. Cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 602(6)
(West Supp. 1983) (permitting a prospective juror to be disqualified on the grounds of "interest ...
in the event of the action, or in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as a
member or citizen or taxpayer of a [municipality]"). The connection between Rule 403 prejudice and
the standards of fitness for jurors has been noted elsewhere. See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 4, § 5215, at 278.
93. See, e.g., Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., American Home Prods., 594 F.2d 1051, 1058
(5th Cir. 1979) (in wrongful death action, evidence that decedent once smoked marijuana excluded
under Rule 403); United States v. Castel, 584 F.2d 87, 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (evidence of defendant's
drinking and "partying habits" excluded under Rule 403), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 925 (1979). But
see United States v. Baumgarten, 517 F.2d 1020, 1029 (8th Cir.) (evidence concerning history and
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emotional interest a piece of evidence evokes may also be influenced by
the degree to which it affects the parties. An example of this is the rolling
car hypothetical described above in which evidence of severe physical
injury resulting from defendant's act was contrasted with evidence of
slight injury to property. 94 Such evidence could have a strong emotional
effect on those jurors whose experiences allow them to project themselves
into the personalities of the parties. 95 The strong connection between
emotional interest and individual personality suggests that the vividness
of evidence and its prejudicial effect varies from juror to juror. 96
The vividness of evidence is not merely a function of its emotional
interest. Evidence is also vivid when it is presented to the jury in a con-
crete, image-provoking form. 97 The persuasive value of photographs and
other pieces of real and demonstrative evidence is well known to scholars
of trial advocacy. 98 Testimony can also be image-provoking and thus vi-
vid. "Plaintiff was severely injured" is not likely to have nearly the im-
pact of "Blood was gushing from the knife wounds in plaintiff's back."
Finally, evidence is also vivid when it is proximate to the jury in a tempo-
ral, spacial or sensory way. 99 Thus, opportunities to feel the heft of the
murder weapon or visit the scene of the accident are likely to have a pro-
found impact on the decisionmaking process. 100
Since vivid evidence is more memorable, it is more available for deci-
sionmaking and more likely to be accepted as representative of the objects
or events it describes than is pallid evidence. 101 Vivid evidence does not,
philosophy of the Students for a Democratic Society and the overall radical movement in America
admitted in prosecution concerning series of bombings), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
95. Lawyers have traditionally assumed that jurors have a tendency to project their own personal-
ities and values into the case's events and parties. Theories of jury selection are usually devised with
this assumption in mind. For example, it has often been suggested that jurors should be selected or
rejected by counsel based upon the similarity of their background to that of the client. T. MAUETr,
supra note 83, at 32-33; Darrow, Selecting a Jury, ESQUIRE, May 1936, at 211 ("Never take a
wealthy man on a jury. He will convict, unless the defendant is accused of violating an antitrust law,
selling worthless stocks or bonds, or something of that kind.").
96. See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5215, at 278-79. But see Miller v. Poret-
sky, 595 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (in an action in which defendant was accused of committing acts
of racial discrimination, evidence that defendant had committed other acts of racial discrimination
was admitted over Rule 403 objection without any mention of the special prejudicial impact such
evidence might have on jurors in the District of Columbia, most of whom are black).
97. R. NISBErr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 47-49.
98. See, e.g., P. BERGMAN, TRIAL ADVOCACY IN A NUTSHELL 44-45 (1979).
99. R. NISBETr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 49-51.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1973) (display in courtroom of
hashish and drug paraphernalia from which offensive odor emanated was unfairly prejudicial despite
prophylactic instructions which could not "undo the sensation" experienced by the jury).
101. The power of image-provoking evidence, for example, is illustrated by a recent study. Sub-
jects were asked to read testimony allegedly given in a drunk driving trial. Defendant was described
to some subjects as having a good character, to others as having a bad character. The vividness of the
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however, necessarily result in inferential error and unfair prejudice. Some
vivid evidence is highly probative, making its impact on the jury's deci-
sionmaking roughly commensurate with its objective probative value.
Courts tend to make the error of judging the prejudicial nature of vivid
evidence by simply measuring how vivid it is. Gory photographs, for ex-
ample, have been excluded only when they are "gruesome and horrify-
ing." 102 The prejudicial potential of vivid evidence, however, is not sim-
ply a function of its vividness relative to other evidence. Prejudice results
only when that vividness exceeds the objective value of the evidence in
question. 103
testimony was similarly manipulated: Some subjects were given vivid prosecution testimony and
pallid defense testimony while the other subjects were given vivid defense testimony and pallid pro-
secution testimony. For instance, the pallid version of the prosecution's effort to prove defendant was
drunk at a party before attempting to drive home stated that defendant staggered against a table and
knocked a bowl to the floor. In the vivid version, the bowl contained guacamole dip which was
splattered on a white shag carpet. The pallid version of the defense effort to show defendant was
sober described defendant successfully leaping out of the way of an approaching "car." In the vivid
version, the vehicle was a "bright orange Volkswagen." After reading the testimony, the subjects
were asked to judge defendant's guilt. The following day, subjects were asked to recall as much
evidence as they could and render a new verdict. The immediate judgment showed no effect for the
vividness manipulation. The delayed judgments sometimes showed a substantial effect: Some sub-
jects exposed to vivid prosecution testimony shifted toward guilty verdicts and others exposed to
vivid defense testimony shifted toward not-guilty verdicts. The memorability of evidence influenced
the final judgments even though memorability had no logical connection to probative value. The
delayed judgments showed the effect of th vividness manipulation only for the good character defen-
dants, and the character manipulation had no effect on either the immediate or delayed verdicts. The
authors of the experiment stated that subjects may have been suspicious that the bad character manip-
ulation was intended to bias them, and thus probably rendered very conservative judgments concern-
ing the bad character defendants. See R. NISBErr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 52-53.
102. United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074
(1979); see also United States v. Shuckahosee, 609 F.2d 1351, 1358 (10th Cir. 1979) (photographs
showing facial wounds from point-blank shots admitted as "not overly 'gruesome' "), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 919 (1980).
103. This suggests that the probative value of evidence must be considered when determining
whether it is unfairly prejudicial as well as when balancing takes place.
Similarly, inferential error may result when highly probative evidence is introduced in pallid form,
such as abstract statistical data. Since the manner in which evidence is offered is largely within the
power of the advocates, the introduction of probative evidence in pallid form will usually not be of
concern to the courts, even if inferential error may result. The courts should not, however, force
counsel to use pallid data when the evidence can be expressed in more vivid form and its probative
value is high. Rule 403 has been improperly used to exclude vivid, highly probative data on the
grounds it would be cumulative of pallid evidence previously introduced. See, e.g., Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127 (1974) (defense offer of magazines and films to demonstrate com-
munity standards in obscenity prosecution rejected because expert witnesses were permitted to testify
about the materials); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1349 (9th Cir. 1977) (defense offer of
tape recording of "representative" post-arrest interview to demonstrate mental state in prosecution
for bank robbery rejected because experts had testified concerning interviews), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1000 (1978).
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B. Knowledge Structures
An analysis of heuristics deals with the procedures by which humans
process data. But human understanding may depend less on these pro-
cedures than it does on the wealth of general knowledge stored in our
brains. Objects and events are seldom evaluated as if sui generis, but are
related to past experiences. People use this stored information to form
general beliefs or theories about the world and the things in it, Such as
"trees are bigger than bushes" and "once a thief, always a thief." These
theories are called knowledge structures. 104
Like heuristics, knowledge structures are vital and largely reliable tools
for processing data. These tools allow for the minimization of computing
time and effort by taking advantage of the redundancies of our world.
They can be propositional (law professors are sarcastic, balding white
males who are fond of unstylish clothing) or schematic (the knowledge
underlying one's awareness of what happens on the first day of class).105
In the complex social domain in which legal issues arise and must be
resolved, however, knowledge structures sometimes lead to inferential
error. Some knowledge structures are inaccurate representations of the
real world. When we encounter someone who processes information
through a knowledge structure we believe is inaccurate, we often regard
that person as biased or prejudiced. In fact, all of us possess and are pos-
sessed by millions of knowledge structures which form preconceptions
influencing how we view the world. These preconceptions tend to make
us resist conflicting evidence and accept confirming evidence, coloring
the way we interpret everything in between.106 In addition, these precon-
ceptions may be applied unconsciously, misleading us into believing data
is being evaluated objectively. 07 When evidence stimulates a juror's
104. See generally R. NISBErr& L. Ross, supra note 58, at28-42.
105. Id. at 28.
106. See generally id. ch. 8 (discussing the extent to which data forces the revision of beliefs).
The power of theories or preconceptions is such that, even when evidence which was used to create a
theory or preconception is discredited, the theory may still survive. Id. at 175-79. This fact calls into
question the efficacy of impeachment and cross-examination, and underscores the advantage given to
whichever party is allowed to put on its case first. One way to combat the impact of theories built
upon potentially prejudicial evidence would be to require that the opposing party be notified that such
evidence will be offered and be given an opportunity to present contradicting evidence before the
prejudicial evidence is introduced. While courts have the power to structure the presentation of evi-
dence, see FED. R. EvmD. 611, at some point the administrative cost and confusion resulting from
reshuffling the evidence ma; be prohibitive.
107. See generally R. NIsBErr & L. Ross, supra note 58, ch. 9 (examining people's success and
accuracy in self-characterization). Since inferential error resulting from the unconscious application
of a bias or preconception may not be subject to the safeguard of self control, it is more dangerous
than intentional abdication of responsibility by the decisionmaker, currently the principal focus of
Rule 403 analysis. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. Since the application of a bias or
preconception may be unconscious, the ability of the advocates to point out the misleading nature of
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utilization of an inaccurate or misleading knowledge structure, inferential
error, and hence unfair prejudice under Rule 403, may result.
It is impossible to identify all the knowledge structures that present a
significant danger of inferential error. Some, such as those based upon
racial or ethnic stereotypes, are common enough and pernicious enough
to be relatively easy to recognize and counteract. Most are more subtle
and can be identified only on a case-by-case basis. But there is one widely
held knowledge structure or theory which has special importance for the
development of the law under Rule 403. This knowledge structure may
lead to inferential error whenever evidence of a party's other crimes or
bad acts is admitted. It is referred to as the Fundamental Attribution Error
(FAE). 108
The FAE postulates that human behavior is caused primarily by the
immutable, consistent disposition of the actor, as opposed to characteris-
tics of the situation or environment to which the actor responds. 109 This
dispositionalist theory of behavior finds expression in a wide range of
sources reflective of its broad acceptance in our culture, including west-
ern theology, 10 the so-called Protestant ethic' and American jurispru-
dence. 112
Despite its broad acceptance, the validity of the FAE, as its name sug-
gests, is doubtful. Studies indicate that a person's behavior in a given
situation cannot be accurately predicted on the basis of personality test
scores or past behavior in a similar situation. 11 3 Slight differences in the
evidence which gives rise to a bias or preconception is limited. Admitting such evidence is thus not
only prejudical but also unfair. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. For the same reason,
the efficacy of instructions to prevent such error may be limited. Many courts, however, simply
assume that instructions will successfully minimize prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Dennis,
625 F.2d 782, 801 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lutz, 621 F.2d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 859 (1980), 449 U.S. 1093 (1981); United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939, 946
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980); United States v. D'Alora, 585 F.2d 16, 21 (1st Cir.
1978). Obviously, if this were the case, there would be no need for Rule 403 as long as there were a
rule requiring the court to give instructions. Several cases have recognized the limited usefulness of
instructions to cure unfair prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir.
1980); United States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1979). See infra note 128.
108. R. NIsBE-T & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 31.
109. Id.
110. Free will is necessary in the theological context if people are to be held morally responsible
for their acts. See St. Augustine, The Freedom of the Will, in FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM 269-77
(B. Berofsky ed. 1966).
111. The view of some Protestant sects that one's financial successes or failures are reflective of
one's worthiness (hence character) in the eyes of God has been identified as one of the origins of
capitalism. M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 170-71 (1958). This
view is by no means, however, restricted to Protestants but has been "diffused all over the world."
Weber, The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOL-
oGY (1946).
112. See 22 C. WRIGHT& K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5170, at 116.
113. See R. NISBETT & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 106-08.
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external situation or environment often produce great differences in most
people's behavior. 114 This is not to suggest that evidence of prior behav-
ior is irrelevant in the legal sense to predicting subsequent behavior. Guilt
in a burglary prosecution is clearly more probable when the defendant has
many prior burglary convictions than when he does not. But Rule 403
presumes that unfairly prejudicial evidence may have probative value.
The point is that psychological studies show that evidence of character or
prior behavior does not provide a very reliable basis for predicting subse-
quent behavior. Coincidentally, the law of evidence has independently
reached the same conclusion. 115
The FAE, like many theories about how the world works, may in part
be a product of heuristics. The actors in an event are usually more vivid
than the pallid background situation and thus are more available in the
decisionmaker's memory when it comes time to attribute reasons for ac-
tions. 116 Actions may be viewed as representative of an actor's character,
notwithstanding the presence of significant external forces perhaps less
salient than the actor herself. Applying these heuristics results in the de-
velopment of a theory about how some part of the world works. That
theory, the product of incomplete and perhaps misleading data, then dic-
tates how subsequently encountered data will be interpreted. The process
of inferential error is thus perpetuated.
C. Rule 403 and the Improper Uses of Heuristics and Knowledge
Structures
Humans employ procedures (heuristics) and theories about objects and
events (knowledge structures) to facilitate inferential processes. While
heuristics often process data accurately, they predictably lead to inferen-
tial error in some situations. Although the majority of our theories about
the world may be accurate, some are not. Employing inaccurate or mis-
leading knowledge structures biases the evaluation of data and can also
lead to inferential error.
Evidence motivating a juror to employ a heuristic or a knowledge
structure in a manner tending to cause inferential error should be deemed
"unfairly prejudicial" under Rule 403. Applying Rule 403 in light of this
conception of unfair prejudice is by no means a simple task. Since the
number of knowledge structures and the number of possible applications
of heuristic reasoning are extremely large, a search for prejudice under
Rule 403 must still be made on a case-by-case basis. The foregoing dis-
114. Id. at 120-21.
115. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
116. See R. NSBr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 122-23.
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cussion provides a heretofore absent theoretical framework with which to
facilitate that search. In order to illustrate the application of this frame-
work, the next part of this article focuses on how the analysis presented in
this part can be used to identify the prejudicial tendencies of other crimes
or acts evidence.
IV. THE PREJUDICIAL IMPACT OF OTHER CRIMES OR ACTS
EVIDENCE
The admissibility of evidence of other crimes or acts of a party is the
most frequently litigated issue under Rule 403,117 if not under the entire
Federal Rules. 118 The reported cases generally fail to consider seriously
the prejudicial nature of such evidence.' 19 Evidence of other crimes or
acts, however, presents a clear danger of inferential error.
A. The Admissibility of Other Crimes or Acts Evidence Under Rule 404
The admissibility of evidence of other crimes or acts of a party presents
issues under Rule 404 of the Federal Rules as well as Rule 403. The prej-
udicial nature of other crimes or acts evidence under Rule 403 can best be
demonstrated by first discussing the treatment of that type of evidence
under Rule 404.
Rule 404 precludes the admission of other crimes or acts evidence
when offered to establish the character of a party as circumstantial proof
of that party's conduct in the present case. 120 Thus evidence that a person
charged with murder has previously beaten others or has been convicted
of assault is inadmissible to prove that the defendant is violent and likely
to have committed the murder.
Several different policies have been advanced to support the exclusion-
ary aspect of Rule 404. It has been suggested that evidence of other
crimes or acts to prove conduct is inadmissible under Rule 404 because it
is irrelevant 121 or, alternatively, marginally relevant but only slightly pro-
117. 22 C. WRIGHT& K. GRAHAM, supra note4, § 5215, at281.
118. Id. § 5239, at 427.
119. In no area of circumstantial evidence is it so necessary as [in evidence of other crimes] to
have at hand a set of basic principles providing a rational method for determining the problem of
admissibility; and probably in no area of judicial administration is there greater uncertainty, due
in part to ... the substantial confusion in the cases concerning the policies of exclusion.
Trautman, Logical orLegalRelevancy--A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385, 403 (1952).
120. FED. R. EVID. 404.
121. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 920 (5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1978); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5239, at 436-37.
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bative. 122 Neither of these explanations of Rule 404 is entirely convinc-
ing. If evidence of other crimes or acts were irrelevant, there would tech-
nically be no need for a specific rule of exclusion since Rule 402 of the
Federal Rules excludes all irrelevant evidence.123 Assuming that evidence
of prior crimes or acts is relevant but only slightly probative of conduct,
the bias of the Federal Rules in favor of admissibility would suggest the
evidence should not be excluded. 124 Rule 404 can best be explained as a
specific application of the general policy of Rule 403. Even if evidence of
other crimes or acts is relevant to prove conduct, albeit only slightly pro-
bative, Rule 404, like Rule 403, excludes such evidence because it is
unduly prejudicial. 125
The prejudicial potential of other crimes or acts evidence is commonly
assumed to be the result of a jury's tendency to ignore the proper issues
and convict the defendant because he is a "bad person.' 26 As suggested
above, however, it is far more likely that evidence will be prejudicial
because, while juries are probably diligent in their effort to decide guilt or
innocence, they may still commit inferential error. 127 Thus the most seri-
ous prejudicial danger presented by other crimes or acts evidence is the
possibility that jurors might consider such evidence probative of character
and conduct when it is not, or much more probative on these issues than it
really is.128 In other words, the greatest danger is not that juries will con-
vict because the defendant is a "bad person." It is that they will convict
because their conclusion that defendant is a "bad person" leads them to
draw inferences concerning his likely conduct that are not reasonable or
are believed with an unreasonable degree of certainty.
122. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character ofSpecificActs Evidence, 66 IowA
L. REV. 777 (1981).
123. Rule 402provides in part that "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
124. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
125. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note: "The rules which follow in this Article are
concrete applications evolved for particular situations. However, they reflect the policies underlying
the present rule...."
126. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Wigmore recognized the potential for both con-
demnation irrespective of guilt and miscalculation of the likelihood of guilt as justification for the rule
excluding other crimes or acts evidence. 1J. IWMoRE, EVIDENCE § 194, at 646 (3d ed. 1940).
128. See 1 H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 205, at 447 (5th ed. 1956), quoted in Drew v.
United States, 331 F.2d 85, 89-90 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1964):
The large majority of persons of average intelligence are untrained in logical methods of
thinking, and are therefore prone to draw illogical and incorrect inferences, and conclusions
without adequate foundation. From such persons jurors are selected. They will very naturally
believe that a person is guilty of the crime with which he is charged if it is proved to their
satisfaction that he has committed a similar offense, or any offense of an equally heinous charac-
ter. And it cannot be said with truth that this tendency is wholly withouteason or justification,
as every person can bear testimony from his or her experience that a man who will commit one
crime is very liable subsequently to commit another of the same description.
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While other crimes or acts evidence is not admissible to prove charac-
ter as circumstantial evidence of conduct, Rule 404(b) indicates such evi-
dence may be admissible for other purposes. Nevertheless, if other crimes
or acts evidence is offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404, it may
still be ruled inadmissible under Rule 403.129 Because the jury might con-
sider the evidence for the improper purpose of proving character as evi-
dence of conduct, 130 the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant may
be great enough to exclude the evidence under this rule. 131
B. The Admissibility of Other Crimes or Acts Evidence Under Rule 403
Courts have generally been insensitive to the prejudicial impact of
other crimes or acts evidence. In a large number of cases, the courts sim-
ply assume that if the evidence is probative of something other than char-
acter, prejudice does not "substantially outweigh" probative value, and
the courts therefore admit the evidence. 132 As a consequence, analysis of
129. See FED. R. EvtD. 404 advisory committee note.
130. This is the so-called "reverberating clang" problem identified by Justice Cardozo in She-
pard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 102-04 (1933), where incriminating out of court statements were
excluded on the grounds that, although arguably admissible for a proper purpose, they would cer-
tainly be considered by the jury for their improper hearsay purpose. This problem, which results from
the application of the doctrine of multiple admissibility, is often dealt with by admitting the poten-
tially prejudicial evidence while instructing the jury to regard the evidence only for its proper pur-
pose. See FED. R. EvID. 105. The efficacy of such instructions to relieve the prejudicial impact of
other crimes or acts evidence is highly problematic. See supra note 107.
131. Evidence of prior crimes or acts should not be automatically admissible under Rule 404
when offered to prove something other than character and conduct. When the likelihood that the jury
will consider the evidence for the improper purpose of proving character or conduct is high and the
probative value of the evidence for the "proper" purpose is negligible, the evidence could be consid-
ered inadmissible under Rule 404. In such a case it could be argued that Rule 404(b) cannot be used
to make a sham of Rule 404(a) by permitting clearly prejudicial evidence to be admitted on a flimsy
pretext. The language of Rule 404 permits this interpretation. Rule 404(b) states that when evidence
is offered for some purpose other than a prohibited one "[it may ...be admissible" (emphasis
added). This language replaced the following language of the proposed rule submitted by the Su-
preme Court: "'This subdivision does not exclude the evidence when offered [for some purpose other
than the prohibited one]." FED. R. EvtD. 404 note by federal judicial center. The implication to be
drawn from this replacement is that evidence offered for a purportedly proper purpose might still be
excluded under Rule 404. Admittedly, however, the language "[it may ... be admissible" might
simply be taken as recognition of the fact the evidence could still be excluded under Rule 403.
It is important to consider which rule can be used to exclude other crimes or acts evidence that
causes prejudice and is only marginally probative of a proper inference. If Rule 403 is used, the issue
is whether the prejudicial impact of the evidence "substantially outweighs" its probative value. If
Rule 404 is applied, the issue might be resolved without a balance tilted in favor of admissibility. As
a consequence, the results might be different depending on which rule is applied. One might argue
that, if other crimes or acts evidence is harmful enough to warrant a specific rule of exclusion, the
veneer of legitimacy bestowed on such evidence by purporting to offer it to prove something other
than character should not be sufficient to favor admissibility. See Kuhns, supra note 122, at 802-03.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Vik, 655 F.2d 878, 881-82 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Foote, 635 F.2d 671, 673-74 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Pry, 625 F.2d 689, 692 (5th Cir.
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the prejudicial effect of other crimes or acts evidence is seldom under-
taken, and no real effort to balance prejudice against probative value oc-
curs. 133 When the prejudicial impact of such evidence is acknowledged,
the courts frequently assume without any stated reasons that it can be
ameliorated by instructions. 134 Even in the absence of instructions, courts
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 925 (1981); United States v. Longoria, 624 F.2d 66, 68 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 858 (1980); United States v. Lutz, 621 F.2d 940, 943-44 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 859 (1980), 449 U.S. 1093 (1981); United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102,
105-08 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946 (1979); United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228,
1240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 877-78
(D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. D'Alora, 585 F.2d 16, 21 (Ist Cir. 1978); United States v. Jack-
son, 576 F.2d 46, 49 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. McGee, 572 F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771, 775 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978);
United States v. Weaver, 565 F.2d 129, 134-35 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 (1978);
Dums v. United States, 562 F.2d 542, 548 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977); United
States v. Gano, 560 F.2d 990, 993-94 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Araujo, 539 F.2d 287, 290
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983 (1976); United States v. Jenkins, 525 F.2d 819, 824 (6th Cir.
1975); United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1079 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049
(1976).
133. The courts applying Rule 403 to other crimes or acts evidence have perpetuated a misguided
approach to the problem of determining admissibility that predates the Federal Rules. See McCoR-
MICK'S HANDBOOKOFTHE LAWOF EvimNCe § 190, at 453 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972):
Most of the opinions ignore the problem and proceed on the assumption that the decision turns
solely upon the ascertainment and application of a rule. If the situation fits one of the classes
wherein the evidence has been recognized as having independent relevancy, then the evidence is
received, otherwise not. This mechanical way of handling these questions has the advantage of
calling on the judge for a minimum of personal judgment. But problems of lessening the dangers
of prejudice without too much sacrifice of relevant evidence can seldom if ever be satisfactorily
solved by mechanical rules. And so here there is danger that if the judges, trial and appellate,
content themselves with merely determining whether the particular evidence of other crimes
does or does not fit in one of the approved classes, they may lose sight of the underlying policy
of protecting the accused against unfair prejudice. The policy may evaporate through the inter-
stices of the classification.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 801 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 88 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lutz, 621 F.2d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 859 (1980), 449 U.S. 1093 (1981); United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314,
322 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979); United States v. D'Alora, 585 F.2d 16,
21 (st Cir. 1978); United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1978). Butsee United States
v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted):
In assessing the risk of prejudice against the defendant, the trial court should carefully con-
sider the likely effectiveness of a cautionary instruction that tries to limit the jury's consideration
of the evidence to the purpose for which it is admissible. Whatever the criticism of such instruc-
tions, they remain an accepted part of our present trial system. However, while their utility is not
to be invariably rejected, neither should it be invariably accepted.... Similarly, the balancing
required by Rule 403 for all evidence would not be needed if a limiting instruction always in-
sured that the jury would consider the evidence only for the purpose for which it was admitted.
Giving the instruction may lessen but does not invariably eliminate the risk of prejudice notwith-
standing the instruction. Rule 403 balancing must therefore take into account the likelihood that
the limiting instruction will be observed.
The same research described in part III, supra, suggests that instructions may be considerably less
efficacious than is commonly assumed. When people are required to conduct self analysis in order to
determine why they act a certain way or think certain thoughts, they are subject to making the same
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have assumed that the admission of other crimes or acts evidence is harm-
less error. 135
This state of the law is profoundly disturbing for a number of reasons.
Not only does failing to balance probative value against prejudicial effect
violate the language of Rule 403, it also frustrates the intent of Rule 404.
When courts fail to acknowledge the prejudicial potential of other crimes
or acts evidence, they ignore the rationale behind the rule of exclusion
articulated in Rule 404. Article IV of the Federal Rules explicitly recog-
nizes the prejudicial impact of only a handful of types of evidence from
among the infinite varieties available. For the courts to ignore that recog-
nition when applying Rule 403 is unconscionable.
The courts' improper evaluation of other crimes or acts evidence under
Rule 403 may result from their initial failure to develop a coherent theory
of the meaning of unfair prejudice. 136 It is also possible, however, that
the courts have generally assumed that other crimes or acts evidence
would survive any balancing test because the courts themselves have be-
come victims of the prejudicial impact of that evidence. Judges may attri-
bute to other crimes or acts evidence a much greater degree of probative-
ness than the evidence objectively warrants. That the courts themselves
commit these inferential errors so frequently should not be altogether sur-
prising because, as the following discussion demonstrates, other crimes
or acts evidence has a great potential to induce such error. 137
C. Other Crimes or Acts Evidence and the Danger of Inferential Error
Evidence of other crimes or acts of a party, particularly a defendant in a
criminal prosecution, has great potential to induce inferential error. The
representativeness and availability heuristics as well as the FAE might all
errors they tend to make when engaging in any other inferential task. R. NISBEMT & L. Ross, supra
note 58, at 226-27 & ch. 9. This suggests that, even if jurors diligently attempt to ignore the prejudi-
cial aspect of evidence as instructed by the court, they may not be conscious of the impact that
evidence has upon them and thus will be unable to control it.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Lentz, 624 F.2d 1280, 1289 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 995 (1981); United States v. Williams, 596 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946
(1979); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000
(1978). But see United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1978) (admitting evidence of
other crimes or acts is not harmless error), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
136. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
137. Research generally indicates inferential error is reduced where decisions are made by a
group. R. NisBErr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 267. This suggests that judges may actually be more
prone to inferential error than juries, assuming the inferential abilities of judges and jurors are rela-
tively equal. Rule 403, of course, is inadequate to protect against inferential error by judges since it
assumes the judge is able to discern the proper and improper inferences which might be derived from
evidence. Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Ecodyne Corp., 635 F.2d 517,519 (5th Cir. 1981).
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be improperly employed by the trier of fact in analyzing this type of evi-
dence.
For example, evidence that the defendant has committed a prior, and
perhaps even similar crime, might be considered representative of the de-
fendant's overall character. 138 In many cases, the defendant's economic,
social, ethnic and racial background may combine with other crimes or
acts evidence to make the defendant's character seem to fit a juror's ste-
reotype of a criminal. 139 Another application of the representativeness
heuristic permits the trier of fact to reason that the crime with which the
defendant has been charged is a representative act for someone with a
criminal's character. The resulting inference of guilt may be resistant to
conflicting base rate data concerning the low probative value of other
crimes or acts evidence, or to pallid evidence that the defendant's prior
act is not truly representative of her character. 140 In this situation, the
representativeness heuristic causes the admission of prior crimes or acts
evidence for a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b) to have the very
prejudicial impact Rule 404(a) seeks to prevent. 14'
138. See generally supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
139. See Saks & Kidd, supra note 59, at 135-36.
140. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. While it has been generally assumed that
other crimes or acts evidence is of low probative value, see FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee
note, citing California Law Revision Commission, empirical support for this assumption is largely
lacking. The assumption appears to be based upon a belief that our knowledge of what makes people
act the way they do is too insubstantial to permit the conclusions that a prior act by a person might
accurately reflect his character and that his character provides a basis for predicting how the person
acted in a particular case. See J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF §§. 54-55 (3d ed. 1937).
There are, however, some statistics in studies of recidivism rates that may suggest other crimes or
acts evidence has limited probative value. See, e.g., U.S. DEPr. OF JUsTiCE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE STATISTiCS 522, table 6.47 (1980) (only 0.5 % of parolees released during 1977 who had
been convicted of murder or nonnegligent manslaughter had been convicted of new murder or nonne-
gligent manslaughter during the first year after release).
141. The chances that the representativeness heuristic will be improperly applied are probably
increased when the other crimes or acts evidence involves a crime or act similar to that with which the
defendant is presently charged. In such a case, the crime with which the defendant is presently
charged may appear very strongly representative of or similar to its generating process, the defen-
dant's character, because that character is itself evidenced by a similar crime or act. Several cases
have recognized the especially high prejudicial impact of evidence of other crimes or acts similar to
that with which the defendant is now charged. See, e.g., United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d
81, 84 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Jimenez, 613 F.2d 1373, 1377 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626, 639 n.18 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980); United
States v, Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 921 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1979). A
number of cases, on the other hand, have observed that when the other crime or act is similar to that
with Which the defendant is now charged, evidence of that crime or act may be highly probative of the
intent, motive or some other matter for which such evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b). None
of these cases, however, acknowledges that these same similarities enhance the prejudicial impact of
such evidence, See, e.g., United States v. Black, 595 F.2d 1116, 1117 (5th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Albert, 595 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979); United States v. Leonard,
524 F.2d 1076, 1091 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976). Thus it would appear that in
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Evidence of other crimes or acts might also lead to inferential error
because of the availability heuristic. Other crimes or bad acts usually of-
fend jurors. The emotional interest and image-provoking quality of other
crimes or acts evidence is likely to be strong, at least when compared to
the possibly pallid explanations offered by the defendant. As a conse-
quence, other crimes or bad acts make vivid evidence which will remain
readily "available" in the juror's memory. 142
Finally, the FAE will likely be triggered by the admission of other
crimes or acts evidence. The FAE postulates that one's actions are the
result of personal disposition. 143 Evidence of other bad acts presumably
will encourage the conclusion that the defendant has a bad character,
which in turn will encourage the inference that the defendant has acted in
conformity with that character in the instant case. Instructions warning
the jury not to draw this conclusion may be futile. 144 As a consequence,
jurors may not only draw exactly the inference Rule 404 attempts to av-
ert, but may also form a theory about the defendant through which they
view all the other evidence in the case. 145 The presumption of innocence
may then become a presumption of guilt. 146 Ironically, efforts by the de-
fense to combat the effects of the FAE by introducing evidence bearing
positively on the defendant's character will open the door for the prosecu-
tion to rebut that evidence, 147 reducing the trial to a fight over whether the
defendant is a "good" or "bad" person.148 The psychological principles
discussed above demonstrate the obvious dangers of this scenario.
some cases the prejudicial impact of evidence of other crimes or acts may increase as the probative
value of that evidence increases.
If the prejudice and probative value simultaneously rise to roughly commensurate levels, Rule 403
could not be used to exclude that evidence since that rule requires that prejudice "'substantially"
outweigh probative value. But there are arguably certain high levels of prejudice requiring exclusion
even if probative value is not substantially outweighed. For example, prejudice that threatens consti-
tutional rights should probably be considered to have reached that level. See, e.g., Weit v. Continen-
tal Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 466-67 (7th Cir. 1981) (evidence of defendants'
lobbying activities, while relevant to charge of conspiracy, might cause jury to incorrectly infer that
the activities themselves were illegal when in fact they were protected by the first amendment), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
142. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. One study suggests that other crimes or acts
evidence may have no special prejudical impact when decisions concerning guilt or innocence are
made soon after the evidence is introduced. When there is delay, the availability of other crimes or
acts evidence relative to other evidence may increase and have a prejudicial impact. See Borgida,
Character Proof and the Fireside Induction, 3 LAw & HUMAN BEHAV. 189, 201 (1979).
143. See R. NisBErr & L. Ross, supra note 58, at 31.
144. See supra note 107. See also United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539, 542 (2d Cir. 1971)
("The average jury is unable, despite curative instructions, to limit the influence of a defendant's
criminal record to the issue of credibility. "), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 844 (1973).
145. See supra note 106.
146. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
147. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
148. Introducing evidence of other crimes or bad acts predictably evokes from the defense evi-
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V. CONCLUSION: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
Psychology can offer useful tools for understanding problems of evi-
dence. While there may be reasons for the law to be wary of these tools in
certain contexts, 149 the science of psychology can fruitfully be applied to
evaluate the potential of evidence to induce inferential error by the trier of
fact.
The law of evidence exists because there are at least two gaps between
the "truth" and the legal judgment which seeks to reflect that truth. Both
gaps are primarily mental. 150 The first gap is created when a human agent
intervenes between the occurrence of a fact or event and the courtroom.
That human agent is the witness. Witnesses create this gap because their
testimony sometimes does not accurately relate what occurred. The sec-
ond gap is created when another human or group of humans, the trier of
fact, becomes involved. Judges and juries create a gap between the truth
and the judgment because the inferences they draw even from accurate
testimony are sometimes in error. The science of psychology offers the
law of evidence the tantalizing prospect of closing these gaps. Since these
gaps are largely the result of the human mind's involvement in this pro-
cess, we" may be able to detect or even eliminate them by studying and
understanding the mind.
Notwithstanding the possible rewards, evidence law has historically
been distrustful of psychology. 151 Since the earliest days of that science,
its proponents have attempted to call attention to the relevance of human
perception, memory and recall studies to the task of closing the gap be-
tween what actually occurred and what the witness describes. 152 The law
has largely rejected these studies on the grounds that the problems of
understanding the mental processes of a witness are so complex and vari-
able that valid generalizations cannot be made. 153 The debate continues to
this day. A principal focus of the scientist is now the unreliability of
dence intended to explain or deny those crimes or bad acts, thus enhancing the prejudicial effect of
the whole exercise by confusing the jury about the act for which the defendant is on trial.
149. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
150. See J. WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 47 (2d ed. 1931).
151. See generally Amolds, Carrol & Seng, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Issue
of Eyewitness Identification in Criminal Trials, 2 N. ILL. L. REv. 59, 77 (1981).
152. See, e.g., H. MUENSTERBERG, ONTHE WITNESS STAND (1908).
153. SeeJ. WIMORE, supra note 150, § 249, at 634 (2d ed. 1931):
But how could it be otherwise? The task is next to insuperable.... The conditions required
for truly scientific observation and experiment are seldom practicable. The testimonial mental
processes are so complex and variable that millions of instances must be studied before safe
generalizations can be made. And the scientist in this field is deprived (except rarely) of that
known basis of truth by which the aberrations of witnesses must be tested before the testimonial
phenomena can be interpreted.
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eyewitness testimony.1 54 Many courts still reject research in this area as
unscientific. 155
Whether or not it makes sense to reject psychology as a means of clos-
ing the gap between the truth and what witnesses say, psychology should
not similarly be rejected as a means of closing the gap between the truth
and what the trier of fact infers. It is admittedly true that the psychology
of inferential processes of jurors is also enormously complex, and that
generalizations about it must be subject to scrutiny. But it is also true that
whenever the law of evidence considers the danger of inferential error by
the trier of fact, it must rely upon such generalizations.
The cases applying Rule 403 make many broad assumptions about how
a jury will make its decisions. 156 For example, courts assume that evi-
dence of other crimes or acts will not induce an "emotional" reaction, 157
pallid testimony is an adequate substitute for vivid evidence, 158 instruc-
tions to the jury will be scrupulously followed, 159 a point-blank photo-
graph of facial wounds is "not overly 'gruesome,' "160 and many other
equally dubious conclusions based upon uninformed judicial efforts at
amateur psychology. If these generalizations are to be made, they should
be based upon studied experimentation and research. The sparse and gen-
eral language of Rule 403 invites the use of psychology or any tool useful
in detecting inferential error. In contrast, the traditional law of evidence
generally purports to fill the gap between the truth and what the witness
says with detailed rules calculated to eliminate unreliable testimony. 16'
154. See, e.g., E. LoJrus, supra note 68.
155. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 97 111. App. 3d 1055, 423 N.E.2d 1206, 1216 (1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1982); see generally Arnolds, Carrol & Seng, supra note 15 1.
156. See supra notes 19 and 33.
157. See supra note 33.
158. See supra note 103.
159. See supra note 107.
160. See supra note 102.
161. See, e.g., FED. R. EvtD. 801 (the hearsay rule); FED. R. EviD. 602 (the rule requiring per-
sonal knowledge of witnesses). A further distinction may be made between the use of psychology
research to determine the reliability of witness testimony and the tendency of evidence to induce the
jury to commit inferential error. Research revealing the perceptual defects of an eyewitness, for ex-
ample, may be offered to impeach the credibility of such a witness. When that research is offered into
evidence, usually through an expert witness, it must be subject to the laws of evidence. When psy-
chology research is offered to demonstrate the existence of heuristics and their potential to induce
inferential error, that research is not being offered into evidence but is offered only to help decide the
admissibility of other evidence which may be unfairly prejudicial. Psychology research offered for
this latter purpose is not subject to the laws of evidence. See FED. R. EViD. 104(a).
Thus a less exacting standard may be required of psychology research considered for the purposes
of making a Rule 403 decision. An analogy might be drawn to Professor Davis' distinction between
adjudicative facts, which go to the jury and relate to the specific parties, and legislative facts, which
involve the development of the law for future litigants. See Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L.
REV. 945, 952 (1955). While adjudicative facts must be strictly supported by the evidence, legislative
facts need not be. Id. at 952-53. It might be convincingly argued, however, that since creating a
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Never before have the courts had a greater need to understand psychol-
ogy. Attorneys have not been reluctant to apply modem psychological
techniques to advance their goal of persuading the jury. 162 The courts
must understand the psychological principles underlying these techniques
in order to recognize when their application distorts the truth. Without
this knowledge, the courts may be unable to prevent the process from
dissolving into trial by marketing strategy. 163
Modem evidence law favors admissibility based upon the assumption
that the truth will be advanced if all relevant evidence is considered. 164
Following the same principle, the law of evidence should not be reluctant
to consider research in psychology relevant to the problems of evidence.
As long as the conclusions of that research are recognized as generaliza-
tions, and the specific applicability of those generalizations is considered
in each case, the "danger" presented by psychology to evidence law will
be minimal. While psychology may not guarantee a neat formula for re-
solving every Rule 403 problem, it does provide a heretofore absent
framework for approaching those problems.
psychological legislative fact might impact many lawsuits and parties, the standards which should be
applied to the research generating such facts should be very stringent. See Suggs, The Use of Psycho-
logical Research by the Judiciary, 3 LAw & HUMAN BEHAV. 135, 137 (1979).
162. The lessons of modem psychology are contained in the basic texts on trial advocacy used in
law school. See, e.g., J. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY §§ 6.10, 13.14 (1975); P. BERGMAN, supra note
98, at 64-67; K. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILLS IN A NUTSHELL 65-66 (1978).
163. See Dancoff, Hidden Persuaders of the Courtroom, BARRISTER, Winter 1982, at 8, 17,
quoting a consultant in the business of helping lawyers plan for jury trials:
Our role is to help the attorney in defining the behavior component of overall trial strategy and
tactics, to understand people and the social and psychological processes that take place during a
jury trial... all in all, we help lawyers position their cases to juries in much the same way you
would sell a bar of soap.., even down to charts and graphs, which we think should come across
to a jury like billboards on a freeway.
164. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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